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Abstract   
Pricing research suggests incentive compatible evaluations of separate products in so-called monadic 
designs when consumers’ situation-specific WTP is to be elicited in a monopolistic purchase setting. In 
our study, the lottery-based BDM-mechanism is applied for measuring subjects’ WTP for a fast moving 
consumer good in binding one-on-one interviews at the point of purchase. In previous studies, the validity 
of elicited WTP measures is commonly checked within subjects with respect to indicators of face and 
criterion validity (such as interest in buying, preference ratings, compliance rates). In addition, we 
observed real purchases of a separate validation sample at the point of purchase, thus checking external 
validity between subjects. As a result, the BDM-based WTPs reveal a sufficient degree of internal face 
validity. However, the external validity in terms of a goodness of fit between WTP-based predictions and 
purchases of the validation sample is significantly reduced. Specifically, we observed a substantial 
underestimation of shares of non-buyers. Hence, a potential bias is indicated, leading to an overrating of 
consumers’ true WTP in the lottery-based BDM-mechanism in the setting of our survey.    
Keywords   
Pricing, Willingness to Pay (WTP), BDM-mechanism, Validation  
    
31. Introduction 
Measuring consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) has been one of the central issues in marketing literature 
during recent decades. The WTP or reservation price denotes the maximum price a consumer is willing to 
pay for a given quality of a product, hence determining the value (utility) a particular product delivers to 
the consumer (Kalish and Nelson, 1991). According to the reservation price concept, WTP represents an 
internally memorized evaluation standard in terms of an upper price threshold that consumers have in 
mind and to which they compare selling prices of a specific product (Fibich et al. 2005). As for buying 
decisions between alternatives in shopping environments, consumers are assumed to construct a 
preference order of products in terms of decreasing positive differentials (net utilities or consumer 
surplus) between reservation and selling prices, and choose the product with the highest consumer 
surplus. 
 Concerning the broad variety of methods applied in interview-based WTP measurements at an 
individual level; research literature basically provides two different types. First, there are competitive 
designs such as the numerous conjoint analysis-based techniques in which subjects are simultaneously 
presented with several competing profiles (i.e. products which are described by a set of different attribute 
levels including prices) of an individually composed consideration set. As for the evaluation, participants 
state their preference over the set of profiles using ratings, rankings, or choices between profiles (Green 
and Srinivasan, 1990; Kalish and Nelson, 1991; Voelckner, 2006b). Subjects’ WTP has to be indirectly 
derived from preferences in statistical analysis. Apart from that, monadic designs in terms of direct 
evaluations of separate options of the consideration set are frequently used in pricing research. In 
monadic designs, subjects are presented with only one particular alternative X. In a standard wording, the 
individual WTP is stated either in an open-ended approach (e.g. “Which is the highest price you are 
willing to pay for X?”) or derived from the maximum price a subject accepted in several binary choices 
(e.g. “Would you buy X at € or not?”; “And would you buy X at € or not?” etc.) in multistage closed-
ended approaches (Gabor and Granger, 1966).  
 In general, literature on pricing research recommends monadic designs for eliciting subjects’ true 
WTP for low-involvement categories, innovative products, or in monopolistic purchase settings 
(Hofstetter and Miller, 2009; Rutström, 1998; Voelckner, 2006b; Wertenbroch and Skierra, 2002). To 
avoid hypothetical biases and overstatements of product values, binding extensions of open-ended 
approaches such as incentive compatible second-price auctions or BDM-lotteries which require real 
4economic commitments of subjects have been introduced (Becker et al., 1964; McAfee and McMillian, 
1987; Murphy et al. 2005, Vickrey, 1961). As for the widely-used BDM-based elicitations of consumers’ 
WTP, subjects are directly asked to indicate the highest price they would be willing to pay for a single 
product. The actual selling price is determined at random in a specific lottery. Subjects are obliged to buy 
the product when the stated WTP is higher than or equal to the selling price, whereas the product cannot 
be purchased if the selling price exceeds the WTP. Thus, subject’s best strategy is to reveal the true 
product value.  
 However, as for the applicability of the BDM-mechanism in surveys, a particular concern is 
whether participants understand the procedure (Harstad, 2000; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Voelckner, 
2006b). Moreover, from the perspective of consumers, a mechanism in which monetary evaluations of 
options are linked to a lottery must be considered artificial to some extent compared to real purchase 
decisions, thus inducing a potential bias. Therefore, researchers typically check the face validity of results 
within subjects by comparing the elicited WTPs to behavioral-based indicators e.g. buying intention or 
craving for items. However, to assess whether particular elicitation techniques provide subjects’ true 
product values in the specific evaluation situation, external validity tests in terms of the goodness of fit 
between WTP-based predictions and real purchases of separate validation samples are basically required.   
 In this context, the main objective of this paper is to contribute to the generalization of research 
findings on WTP measurements in accordance with the widely accepted paradigm of replications with 
extensions (Hubbard and Armstrong, 2003; Pechtl, 2009). More specifically, we examined whether 
BDM-based evaluations of product values provide consumers’ true willingness to pay for a low-
involvement consumer good at the point of purchase. In addition to standard checks of face validity, 
significance of results was explicitly tested by comparing choice predictions based on elicited WTPs with 
real purchases of a matched validation sample. 
2. Literature review, research questions, and contribution of the paper  
While consumers’ true willingness to pay has been an important issue in pricing literature for some time, 
empirical examinations of valid measurement procedures are still encountering various conceptual and 
practical difficulties. For instance, consumers’ true WTP is basically assumed to be an unobservable 
construct. Thus, two crucial problems are measuring consumers’ WTP as well as testing face validity in 
terms of determining the extent to which the WTP elicited with particular methods can be considered a 
sufficient approximation of consumers’ true product values. Moreover, due to the varying needs and 
5wants of consumers at the particular time of purchase, it is suggested that the WTP be regarded as a 
function of the utility delivered in the specific value elicitation situation (Voelckner, 2006b). In addition, 
recent research suggests the proposition that the reservation price is more accurately represented as an 
individual range than as a single price point due to consumers’ limited capacity for processing 
information as well as the induced uncertainty about the true product performance and individual 
preferences (Gregory et al., 1993; Wang et al. 2007).  
 As a result, pricing literature still stresses the importance of comprehensive further research on 
both conditions under which particular methods come at least as close as possible to consumers’ true 
WTP as well as adequate procedures for testing validity of WTP estimates (Voelckner, 2006b; 
Wertenbroch and Skierra, 2002). As for particular methods, competitive designs such as the conjoint 
analysis-based techniques are generally suggested for measuring consumers’ WTP in limited or extensive 
buying decisions such as expensive high-involvement goods e.g. cars, PCs, TVs, stereo systems, DVD 
players and others (Voelckner, 2006a). Purchase decisions of this kind are characterized by a thorough 
cognitive trade-off between perceived overall product values and prices of several competing options. 
Hence, consumers are assumed to undertake considerable efforts in seeking and processing information 
about a bundle of relevant product features before a particular option is chosen.  
 In contrast, monadic WTP measurements are proposed whenever the individual degree of 
information processing is assumed to be reduced such as in habitual buying decisions. More specifically, 
researchers frequently examined incentive compatible open-ended approaches such as the BDM-
mechanism especially when consumers’ situation-specific true WTP for established low-involvement 
products (e.g. telephone cards, mulled wine, doughnuts; Voelckner, 2006b), innovative products (e.g. 
cleaning product for high-tech equipments; Hofstetter and Miller, 2009), or for separately offered options 
without substitutes in monopolistic purchase settings is to be elicited (e.g. soft drinks, pound cake offered 
on a ferry/beach; Wertenbroch and Skierra, 2002). Researchers widely agree on the main advantages and 
disadvantages of the BDM-mechanism. It can be administered in any kind of one-on-one interviews and it 
elicits consumers’ WTP in a single stage design (one-shot measurement). In addition, it ensures incentive 
compatibility for it penalizes subjects for lying and rewards them for truthfully telling the real WTP due 
to a segregation of the stated WTP and the actual selling price of the test product (Wang et al., 2007). 
Moreover, in contrast to monadic Vickrey auctions, a potential overbidding bias is assumed to be avoided 
in BDM-mechanisms since choosing a product is not linked to any kind of contest between competing 
6bidders (Kagel et al., 1987). However, similar to second-price Vickrey auctions, a particular concern is 
whether BDM is behaviorally incentive-compatible, meaning that participants understand the underlying 
procedure (Harstad, 2000; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Voelckner, 2006b). Therefore, detailed instructions for 
participants about the best strategy in BDM-mechanisms in terms of truthfully stating the WTP are 
typically required at the beginning of the interviews. Moreover, it is occasionally argued in literature that 
direct statements of consumers’ WTP induce increased attentions to the pricing question. As a 
consequence, subjects’ price sensitivity is expected to increase, thus potentially lowering the stated 
willingness to pay (Chernev, 2003; Lyon, 2002). Finally, from the perspective of consumers, the 
underlying BDM-mechanism in which monetary evaluations of options are linked to a lottery must be 
considered artificial to some extent compared to real purchase decisions in natural shopping environments 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  
 While research on the validity of particular WTP measurements has a long tradition in pricing 
literature (see e.g. Frykblom, 2000; Noussair et al., 1998; Sattler and Nitschke, 2003; Voelckner 2006b; 
Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002), our study differs from the bulk of papers in the validation procedure and 
in the survey environment. As for the latter, we deliberately elicited subjects’ situation-specific WTP in 
experimental interviews at the point of purchase instead of laboratory environments as proposed by other 
researchers in the field (Wertenbroch and Skierra, 2002). Regarding validity tests in most previous 
studies, elicited WTPs are typically correlated with ex post-evaluations of subjects’ decisions and 
indicators of buying behavior such as satisfaction with transactions, preference ratings for products under 
test, subjects’ craving for items, interest in buying test products, or subjects’ willingness to fulfill buying 
obligations (see e.g. Voelckner, 2006b, Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002). In contrast, only a very few 
studies derived validity of WTP estimates from real buying decisions. As an example, in a study by 
Bhatia and Fox-Rushby (2003), a sub sample of all participants of a survey was presented with the test 
product at a particular price four weeks after the experiment was conducted.  
 In general, since elicited information about subjects’ product values is meant to provide 
substantial support for managerial pricing decisions, a check of WTP estimates elicited in binding designs 
(real choices) against purchases of matched consumer samples observed in real markets or at least in 
market-like settings is recommended. Therefore, validity checks in our study have been deliberately 
focused on real purchase decisions. Since we were interested in eliciting subjects’ product values in the 
specific evaluation situation, assessing the validity of elicited WTP measures by using real market shares 
7could be misleading due to a differing demand of regular consumers. Moreover, real market data do not 
include any information about non-buyers. Therefore, separate validation samples were used to validate 
elicited WTP between subjects.  
3. Design of the study 
A non-convenience sample of 99 subjects (termed hereafter: condition BDM) was interviewed over a 
two-week period in a local store of a national retail chain. Only regular buyers of a low-involvement fast 
moving consumer good category (chocolate hazelnut spreads) with sufficient buying experience were 
considered. Based on real in-store purchases observed over a four-week period before the survey was 
conducted, we selected the two top-selling brands Nutella (market share: 65%) and Nusspli (17%) as 
predefined test products for reason of ensuring sufficient response among participants (see table 1).  
Table 1  Market-based number of sales (observation period: 4 weeks) 
Regular 
price 
Calendar 
week 32
Calendar 
week 33
Calendar 
week 34
Calendar 
week 35
Total 
sales
Absolute 
share 
Relative 
share
Nutella (400g) 1.79€ 144 149 120 120 533 65% 79%
Nusspli (400g) 1.49€ 32 34 37 41 144 18% 21%
Nudossi (400g) 2.69€ 8 12 16 12 48 6% 
Gut&Günstig 
(400g) 
0.99€ 17 30 15 34 96 12% 
Total  201 225 188 207 821 100% 100%
 As for the general procedure of the interview, computer-assisted personal one-on-one interviews 
(CAPI) using virtual shelves on a screen were conducted. Recruited subjects received no money for 
participating to avoid endowment effects (Thaler, 1985). The survey was realized at a sales stand located 
near of the entrance of the local retail store before subjects did their regular shopping at the point of 
purchase. After formal instructions including a detailed standard briefing about the procedure, best 
strategy, and potential commitments in terms of buying obligations (see e.g. Wertenbroch and Skiera 
2002, p. 239), we started with a trial run with respect to the applied payoff-mechanism. Note, that the 
actual interview did not start until the respondent succeeded in understanding both the mechanism of the 
particular elicitation technique under test as well as the best strategy in terms of truthfully stating the 
WTP. Moreover, subjects were explicitly assured that they would not have to spend any more for the 
spread than they really wanted to.  
 At the start of the actual interview, subjects had to indicate which of the two predefined brands, 
if any, they would prefer when spreads would be offered for sale (narrow consideration set). Afterwards, 
8subjects had to evaluate this preferred brand in a monadic, that is, a monopolistic purchase situation. 
Participants were asked to indicate the highest price they would be willing to pay for the preferred spread 
in that specific evaluation situation. After the product evaluation, sample demographics, indicators of 
preferences and the situation-specific demand for the preferred brand were gathered (see e.g. 
Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002, p. 231). Specifically, participants rated whether they were interested in 
buying the preferred spread at this moment, and how much they liked the item on an eleven-point Likert 
scale. Moreover, subjects had to estimate the regular market price of the preferred brand in the local store. 
In addition, consumer profiles with respect to general indicators of buying behavior were gathered. That 
means that subjects had to indicate most frequently purchased brands in the category, the propensity to 
seek bargains, and whether their purchase decisions between spreads are primarily price- or quality-
driven.  
 As for the economic commitments, potential buying obligations and selling prices of the 
preferred brand were determined by a standard BDM-mechanism after the survey. The interviewer drew a 
price tag from an urn containing several prices. Prices were uniformly distributed within a category-
specific market price range. While characteristics of the price distribution were not reported to subjects 
during the survey, they were told that they could check the content of the urn at the end of the experiment. 
Participants were obliged to buy the brand with their own pocket money at this selling price, provided the 
stated WTP exceeded or was at least equal to the selling price. Otherwise, the product could not have 
been purchased. Any transactions were realized immediately at the end of the interview.   
 In order to check external validity, a validation sample of about 160 consumers (termed 
hereafter: control condition) was interviewed over the two-week survey period at a separate sales stand. 
Note that subjects of this matched validation sample neither participated in the survey of the BDM 
condition nor knew that a different survey was conducted simultaneously. Again, only experienced 
consumers of spreads were recruited. In a first step, participants were asked to state the preferred option 
of the two predefined brands. After that, the preferred brand was separately presented on a virtual shelf. 
Subjects had to indicate in a one-shot measurement whether they would buy the brand at a particular test 
price or not. As for the test prices of the preferred spread, either a bargain price in terms of a substantial 
price cut (split I: Nutella 1.49€, split II: Nusspli 0.99€) or the regular store price (split III: Nutella 1.79€, 
split IV: Nusspli 1.49€) was selected at random. After gathering sample demographics and consumer 
profiles, subjects who indicated to buy immediately had to pay with their own pocket money for receiving 
9the chosen product. Hence, the decision setting in the control condition incorporates basic conditions of 
real purchases.  
 Note, that subjects were assigned at random to the control condition and the BDM condition 
during the recruiting procedure. As a consequence, no systematic differences in the situation-specific 
demand of subjects of both conditions are to be expected. Therefore, the matched validation sample can 
reasonably be considered an adequate benchmark for testing external validity of elicited WTP measures. 
4. Results of the study  
In a first step, homogeneity of the matched samples was tested. As for demographic characteristics and 
consumer profiles, we found no significant differences between the BDM condition and the control 
condition (for each tested combination: ²<3.4, n.s.). In addition, further pre-analysis confirms 
consistency of our results. For instance, relative shares of most frequently purchased brands are almost 
identical under the BDM condition (77% Nutella vs. 23% Nusspli) and the validation sample (70% vs. 
30%). The observed frequencies reveal a sufficient fit to long term relative market shares of the brands 
being tested as based upon regular in-store purchases (see table 1 79% vs. 21%). 
 As for subjects’ product evaluations under the BDM condition, results consistently indicate a 
lower (higher) mean WTP for the brand Nusspli (Nutella) that is offered at a lower (higher) price level in 
the retail test store (see the upper section of table 2). As for the face validity of the elicited WTPs, we 
tested several preference and demand measures as commonly suggested by researchers in the field (see 
e.g. Hofstetter and Miller, 2009; Wertenbroch and Skierra, 2002). Hence, we correlated subjects’ WTP 
with stated preference ratings, subjects interest in buying and estimations of the regular market price of 
the preferred spread. As shown in the middle section of table 2, correlation coefficients have the expected 
positive signs and turn out to be significant, meaning the larger the stated ratings and price estimations the 
higher subjects’ WTP. In addition, we checked plausibility of segment-specific WTP distributions with 
respect to particular indicators of  buying behavior (consumer profiles). Consistently, willingness to pay 
is significantly higher (lower) for quality-seeking (price conscious) subjects and consumers who accept 
regular prices in general instead of buying chocolate hazelnut spreads only when substantial price cuts are 
offered (see the lower section of table 2). Therefore, with respect to this commonly used indicators, the 
WTP measurements based on the BDM-mechanism reveal a sufficient degree of face validity. 
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Table 2  WTP, correlation with measures of face validity, and segment-specific differences 
Preferred Brand 
Nutella (n = 78) Nusspli (n = 21)
Willingness to 
Pay
Market price          1.79€                1.49€ 
Mean WTP          1.75€                1.13€ 
s          0.56                0.27 
Correlation (r) 
of WTP and 
Preference / 
Demand 
Measures
How much do you like spread X? 
(11-point scale) 
         r=.467+++                  r=.527++
Are you interested in buying spread X 
now? (11-point scale) 
         r=.417+++                  r=.493++
Please state the price you normally pay 
for spread X! 
         r=.705+++                  r=.464++
Differences (d) 
in mean WTP 
(€) of 
consumer
profiles
Price-oriented subjects n=26  
|d|=0.75***
n=09  
|d|=0.38***Quality-oriented subjects n=52 n=12 
Subjects who are searching for 
bargains 
n=21a
|d|=0.59 **
n=08a   
|d|=0.35***
Subjects who are willing to accept 
regular prices 
n=41a n=08a
++ p<0.05 that r=0; +++ p<0.01 that r=0 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 in a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
a  16 (5) subjects who preferred Nutella (Nusspli) indicated mixed answers and were excluded   
 For assessing criterion validity of the elicited WTP values, we checked whether subjects were 
willing to fulfill their buying obligations after the experiment. In contrast to the sufficient performance of 
the BDM elicitation technique with respect to indicators of face validity, we observed a notable 
percentage of participants who refused to buy the preferred brand although they were committed to 
purchase. More specifically, 11% (6 of 52) of the participants did not comply with their obligation and 
refused to realize transactions, although the individual WTP exceeded or was at least equal to the drawn 
selling price. Note that the observed refusals are unlikely to be induced by subjects’ not fully 
understanding the economic commitments, the applied procedure, and the best strategy since a high 
percentage of participants (more than 85%) indicated they understood the mechanism in the first trial run 
at the beginning of the experiment. However, compared with rates of rejection observed in previous 
studies e.g. below 7.5% (3 of 40) in the field study of Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002), the reduced 
compliance rate has to be considered substantial. Thus, the reduced criterion validity must be considered a 
first indicator of overestimations of subjects’ WTP under the BDM condition in the specific evaluation 
situation. In sharp contrast, each non-buyer stated to be satisfied with the outcome of the lottery-based 
procedure, hence indicating no substantial understatement of WTPs by subjects.  
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 For determining external benchmarks of subjects’ true situation-specific WTP in the particular 
evaluation situation, purchases of brands at the test prices (regular or bargain price) in the splits of the 
control condition were used. As for predictions of choice shares based on the WTP elicited under the 
BDM condition, a standard reservation price model was applied. To determine test price-dependent 
proportions of demand, each participant was considered a buyer of the preferred spread as long as the 
individual brand-specific WTP was larger than or at least equal to the regular price, and the bargain price 
of the spreads, respectively (pWTP). As shown in table 3, the fit between observed benchmark shares 
and WTP-based predicted shares have to be considered underperforming to some degree. As a 
consequence, substantial absolute deviations (AD) of predictions are detected. The mean AD (17.6%) is 
striking and indicates a limited external validity of the WTP measurement based on the particular open-
ended BDM-approach under test. Further, as for the fraction of non-buyers, the predicted shares of 
spreads are overstated in general, whereas shares of a no-buy option are considerably underestimated 
compared with the percentage of purchase refusals observed in the splits of the validation sample. For 
example, the observed share of non-buyers in split I is 45% (100-55%), whereas the predicted share based 
on the WTP elicited under the BDM-mechanism is only about 25%. Thus, subjects’ stated WTP for the 
preferred brand must be considered excessive to some extent. However, the correlation between observed 
and predicted choice shares turns out to be notably high (r=0.926, p<0.10), hence indicating at least a 
strong linear relationship in general.  
Table 3  WTP-based predictions vs. observed share of buyers  
 Control Condition (n=162)  BDM Condition (n=99) 
Brand Split 
Test
prices 
n
Observed 
share 
Predicted  
share 
AD  
Nutella III 1.79€ 55 25.5%  46.2% 20.7  
Nutella I 1.49€ 60 55.0%  74.4% 19.4  
Nusspli IV 1.49€ 16 24.9%  23.8% 1.2  
Nusspli II 0.99€ 31 51.6%  81.0% 29.3  
5. General discussion  
The general objective of this study was to examine the validity of WTP measurements based upon the 
widely-used BDM elicitation technique. Specifically, we investigated evaluations of real products in 
binding experimental one-on-one interviews at the point of purchase. In sharp contrast to previous studies 
in the field, we observed real purchases of a separate validation sample to assess the external validity of 
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WTP measures. According to our results, several issues concerning both the applicability of lottery-based 
techniques for eliciting consumers’ WTP at the point of purchase as well as the assessment of the validity 
of product values elicited under the BDM-mechanism become apparent and should be discussed briefly.  
 Firstly, regarding the limited predictive validity of WTP estimates in our study, an inadequacy of 
the lottery-based monadic elicitation technique under test is detected. While the BDM-mechanism proves 
to elicit adequate product values with respect to commonly used indicators of face validity (e.g. stated 
preferences, interest in buying, consumer profiles), WTP-based predictions significantly underestimate 
the share of non-buyers in the matched validation sample. Therefore, elicited WTPs must be considered 
overrated to some extent. Note that in contrast to Vickrey auctions, lottery-based mechanisms such as the 
BDM-mechanism are generally assumed to avoid a potential overbidding bias since choosing a product is 
not linked to any kind of contest between competing bidders (Kagel et al., 1987). Hence, an impact of a 
perceived competitive pressure is avoided (Voelckner, 2006b). However, a question arises whether the 
overrating of WTPs is promoted by so-called gambling effects in terms of subjects feeling attracted to 
chance, hence reaping a valuable utility of the tension provided by the lottery-based framing and 
determination of economic commitments. As an example, according to empirical studies on risk research, 
there is evidence that the BDM-mechanism significantly biases estimates of so-called certainty 
equivalents (i.e. a stated sure payoff for which a subject is indifferent between receiving a gamble or the 
sure amount of money) under particular conditions (Albers et al., 2000). Hence, on the assumption that 
gambling effects hold true for the BDM-mechanism in the setting of our survey, subjects indicate to be 
willing to pay a particular price for a product in the lottery-based evaluation situation, although they are 
unwilling to buy the product when it is offered in the market-like setting under the control condition. 
Thus, the induced underestimation of shares of non-buyers in the validation sample could be reasonably 
explained. However, because the efficacy of an attraction to chance is rather a new hypothesis in pricing 
research on lottery-based WTP elicitations, both the occurrence as well as the magnitude of gambling 
effects should be investigated in replication studies under controlled conditions in laboratory 
environments.  
 On the other hand, as proposed by other researchers in the field, the high measures of correlation 
between WTPs elicited under the BDM-mechanism and subjects’ estimations of market prices (i.e. prices 
subjects normally pay for the preferred brand) may imply that subjects tend to anchor their evaluations on 
an internally memorized standard (reference price). As a consequence, subjects are expected to proceed a 
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heuristic memory- or experience-based evaluation of products in the interview in terms of stating prices 
they are normally willing to pay in real buying decisions at the point of purchase. However, the anchored 
WTP might be different from the situation-specific true WTP at which subjects are willing to buy the test 
product in the specific evaluation situation (Blatter et al., 2009; Chernev, 2003; Wertenbroch and Skierra, 
2002).  
 Secondly, compared to other studies in the field, we observed somewhat decreased compliance 
rates hence indicating a reduced criterion validity of elicited WTP measures. Note that purchase rejections 
are unlikely to be induced by subjects’ not fully understanding the economic commitments, the applied 
lottery, and the best strategy since the actual survey under the condition BDM started only when subjects 
proved to comprehend the procedure. From our point of view, this finding might be explained by the 
survey setting in our study. The majority of previous studies tested and verified the applicability of 
binding monadic designs such as the BDM-mechanism in monopolistic purchase settings in which 
options’ are separately evaluated without available substitutes e.g. in lab-based experiments or field 
surveys without competing alternatives. As for these monopolistic contexts, the observed rate of rejection 
in terms of subjects who did not comply with buying obligations turns out to be considerably low. 
However, as for the particular survey location in our study (a sales stand in front of a retail store), a 
question arises as to what extent the number of fulfilled buying obligations was downsized because 
particular subjects expected an in-store-bargain price which is even lower than the drawn experimental 
selling price. Again, subjects indicate a high willingness to pay in the specific evaluation situation during 
the experiment although they are unwilling to buy the product afterwards. However, because the efficacy 
of consumers’ price expectations and the induced effect on situation-specific WTP elicitations is rather a 
tentative conclusion based on subjects’ statements after the survey, further research should take the 
influence of different survey locations and environments on the significance of WTP measurements into 
account.
 Finally, it should be noted that the results reported in this paper are based upon an experimental 
field study of a single product category only. Hence, significance of our findings could be limited and 
might not generalize to other categories such as consumer durables or high involvement products, and 
other framings e.g. different survey locations. However, future research should further investigate the 
efficacy of potential gambling effects in lottery-based WTP measurements, and the applicability of 
binding monadic approaches in WTP elicitations at the point of purchase where substitutes are available. 
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Moreover, according to our results, standard within subject validations of elicited WTPs in terms of face 
validity and criterion validity measures should be supported by market-like decisions of matched 
validation samples, if procurable. Taking into account that information about consumers’ WTP elicited in 
laboratory-based or field experiments is basically supposed to give substantial support for pricing 
decisions of managers in retailing and manufacturing industries, the importance of this issue is stressed.   
15
References 
Albers, W., Pope, R., Selten, R., Vogt, B., 2000. Experimental evidence for attractions to chance. German 
Economic Review 1 (2), 113–130. 
Becker, G.M., DeGroot, M.H., Marschak, J., 1964. Measuring utility by a single-response sequential 
method. Behavioral Science 9 (3), 226–232. 
Bhatia, M.R. & Fox-Rushby, J.A., 2003. Validity of willingness to pay: hypothetical versus actual 
payment. Applied Economics Letters 10 (10), 737–740. 
Blatter, D., Miller, K., Hofstetter, R., Krohmer, H., 2009. Improving the direct estimation of demand by 
adjusting for incorrect price-statements. Proceedings of the 38th EMAC Conference, Mai 2009, 
Nantes, France. 
Chernev, A., 2003. Reverse pricing and online price elicitation strategies in consumer choice. Journal of 
Consumer Psychology 13 (1/2), 51–62. 
Fibich, G., Gavoius, A., Lowengart, O., 2005. The dynamics of price elasticity of demand in the presence 
of reference price effects. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 33 (1), 66–78.  
Frykblom, P., 2000. Willingness to pay and the choice of question format: experimental results. Applied 
Economic Letters 7 (10), 665–667. 
Gabor, A., Granger, C.W.J., 1966. Price as an indicator of quality: Report on an enquiry. Economica, 33 
(129), 43–70. 
Green, P.E., Srinivasan, V., 1990. Conjoint analysis in marketing: New developments with implications 
for research and practice. Journal of Marketing  54 (4), 3–19. 
Gregory, R., Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., 1993. Valuing environmental resources: a constructive approach. 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 7 (2), 177–197.  
Harstad, R.M., 2000. Dominant strategy adoption and bidders` experience with pricing rules. 
Experimental Economics 3 (3), 261–280. 
Hofstetter, R., Miller, K., 2009. Bessere Preisentscheidungen durch Messung der Zahlungsbereitschaft. 
Marketing Review St. Gallen 26 (5), 32–37. 
Hubbard, R., Armstrong, J.S., 1994. Replications and extensions in marketing: Rarely published but quite 
contrary. International Journal of Research in Marketing 11 (3), 233–248. 
Kagel, J.H., Levin, D., 1993. Independent private value auctions: bidder behavior in first-, second-, and 
third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Economic Journal 103 (419), 868–79. 
16
Kagel, J.H., Harstad, R.M., Levin, D., 1987. Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with 
affiliated private values: A laboratory study. Econometrica 55 (6), 1275–1304. 
Kalish, S., Nelson, P., 1991. A comparison of ranking, rating and reservation price measurement in 
conjoint analysis. Marketing Letters 2 (4), 327–335.  
Lyon, D., 2002. The price is right (or is it?). Marketing Research 14 (4). 8–13. 
McAfee, R.P., McMillian, J., 1987. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature 25 (2), 699-
738. 
Mitchell, R., Carson, R., 1989. Using Surveys to value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method. 
Washington DC.  
Murphy, J., Allen, P.G., Stevens, T., Weatherland, D., 2005. A meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in 
stated preference valuation. Environmental and Resource Economics 30 (3), 313–325. 
Noussair, C., Robin, S., Ruffieux, B., 2004. Revealing consumers' willingness to pay: A comparison of 
the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction. Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (6), 725-41. 
Pechtl, H., 2009. Value structures in a decoy and compromise effect experiment. Psychology and 
Marketing 26 (8), 736–759. 
Rutström, E. E., 1998. Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design. International Journal 
of Game Theory 27 (3), 427–441. 
Sattler, H., Nitschke, T., 2003. Ein empirischer Vergleich von Instrumenten zur Erhebung von 
Zahlungsbereitschaften. Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 55 (6), 264–281.  
Thaler, R. H., 1985. Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science 4 (3), 199–214. 
Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16 
(1), 8–37. 
Voelckner, F., 2006a. Methoden zur Messung individueller Zahlungsbereitschaften: Ein Überblick zum 
State of the Art. Journal für Betriebswirtschaft 56 (1), 33–60. 
Voelckner, F., 2006b. An empirical comparison of methods for measuring consumers’ willingness to pay. 
Marketing Letters 17 (2), 137–149. 
Wang, T., Venkatesh, R., Chatterjee, R., 2007. Reservation price as a range: An incentive-compatible 
measurement approach. Journal of Marketing Research 44 (2), 200–213. 
Wertenbroch, K., Skiera, B., 2002. Measuring consumers' willingness to pay at the point of purchase. 
Journal of Marketing Research 39 (2), 228–241.
 
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
P.O. Box  4120 | 39016 Magdeburg | Germany
Tel.: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 85 84
Fax: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 21 20
www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de
ISSN 1615-4274
